VBRC - Final Report - Vol 2 2. Emergency and incident management The State’s emergency management framework is fundamental to the effective delivery of emergency services. The framework provides for planning of and preparation for the management of crises and natural disasters; coordinating the actions of government, response agencies and communities in the lead- up to and during disasters; and assigning priorities to response and recovery efforts. On 7 February 2. 00. At the incident level, AIIMS (the Australasian Inter- service Incident Management System) is an effective tool for fire managers. It relies not on technical application alone but also on individual competencies and commitment, sound operational leadership and effective planning at every level. This was evident to varying degrees on Black Saturday. COMBINED EARTHMOVING COURSES (Plant Tickets) FULL FEE PRICES; Any combination of Bobcat, Backhoe, Excavator & Front End Loader courses; No. This document defines commonly used risk management terms and sets out the risk register format that Victoria. Plan is made of four stages. Days such as 7 February, however, highlight the crucial need for incident- and state- level management teams to prepare, plan and direct operations on the ground and to ensure that information and warnings are provided to firefighters and the community. People risking their lives at the firefront need information about the current status of and predictions for a fire, as well as warnings on safety- related matters such as the arrival of a wind change. Incident management also involves the issuing of warnings to those in the predicted path of a fire—something that is vital for community safety. These are not easy tasks, and they call for experienced, competent and well- prepared incident controllers to lead incident management teams. Fire agencies also need to judiciously select, train and prepare these teams so that they are well positioned to cope with the pressures they will face. This chapter explores the arrangements for incident and emergency management at the local, regional and state levels as they applied on 7 February, the conduct of some individuals with statewide responsibilities, deficiencies in some emergency management arrangements, and ways in which the arrangements can be improved. Primary Concerns. The Commission heard evidence about management of the 1. Volume I. Some fires were generally well managed—for example, the slower moving . The management of other fires exposed a series of systemic shortcomings that impeded incident management and the state- level emergency management arrangements and contributed to the catastrophic consequences arising from 7 February. The Commission identified the following primary concerns in relation to emergency and incident management. Inconsistencies in the levels of preparedness of IMTs and the facilities of incident control centres, the duplication of management between the CFA and DSE, and ambiguities in the allocation of authority and responsibility at the incident level are all described in detail in Part One of Volume I. Ultimately, responsibility for the operational preparedness of the fire agencies rests with the Chief Officer of the CFA and the Chief Fire Officer of DSE. The need for a heightened state of preparedness was apparent before 7 February. On Thursday 5 February 2. Chief Officers warned the public that weather conditions on the Saturday were forecast to be worse than those on Ash Wednesday, a message reiterated by the Premier on 6 February. Victoria has a history of exceptionally dangerous fire danger days, among them days now known as Black Friday (1. January 1. 93. 9) and Ash Wednesday (1. February 1. 98. 3), both of which were characterised by temperatures above 4. The fires of that day were the subject of the Report of the Board of Inquiry into the Occurrence of Bush and Grass Fires in Victoria, by Sir Esler Barber. Sir Esler rejected the notion that poor preparation for an emergency can be excused by . He said this is particularly the case where the . They had been forecast and taken note of, and the potential danger had been publicised several days before 7 February. The fire and emergency services’ standard of preparation must be viewed in this context. On 5 February each Chief Officer made clear to his senior staff and regional managers the arrangements that needed to be in operation for incident- level command and control on 7 February. Mr Russell Rees of the CFA asked that pre- designated ICCs be ready for a . Similarly, Mr Ewan Waller of DSE conveyed the message that personnel should be on standby at their work locations and ready to go. Despite these instructions for the highest level of preparedness, the actual state of readiness of level 3 IMTs on the day varied across regions and agencies. This affected the quality of the overall operational response. The lowest levels of compliance with the Chief Officers’ directives appear to have been in the areas affected by the most catastrophic fires—Kilmore East and Murrindindi. The CFA’s Region 1. Duty Officer and Coordinator for the North East Area, Mr Peter Creak, gave evidence that, given the personnel available, it would not have been possible to have each level 3 incident control centre staffed in his area at the . DSE’s Land and Fire Manager for the North East, Mr Peter Farrell, did not take sufficient steps to ensure the allocation of qualified level 3 staff to ICCs in his area, resulting in the seriously underprepared Alexandra ICC, which ultimately had control of the Murrindindi fire. Chapter 1. 0 in Volume I provides details about the preparations made in the North East Area. The CFA and DSE did do some effective interagency planning in Regions 4 and 6, where they both worked to strengthen relationships and complement each other in order to manage incidents effectively. An email Chief Commissioner Ms Christine Nixon sent to all members and staff directed that municipal emergency coordination centres be ready to activate, that divisional coordination centres be on standby and that regional operations centres be activated by no later than 1. Saturday. Police at the local level were also asked to make contact with local representatives of the CFA, DSE and Parks Victoria. Similar messages were conveyed in an email on 6 February from Deputy Commissioner Mr Kieran Walshe to all regional assistant commissioners. The evidence in relation to the individual fires demonstrates that Victoria Police succeeded in achieving a high level of preparedness, enabling police to provide valuable support to the fire agencies, both on the ground and through the municipal emergency coordination centres. Additionally, the Victorian Emergency Management Council Coordination Group met on 5 February to share information about operational preparations and advice to the community. At this meeting, the CFA and DSE representatives informed Police and Emergency Services Minister the Hon. Bob Cameron MP that the agencies were . The direction from the Chief Officers to achieve the highest level of preparedness required that these 1. February, that ICC facilities be tested and activated, and that a level 3 Incident Controller be in position. The purpose of this was to allow IMTs to immediately assume management of fires that could not be suppressed by initial attack. As described in detail in Part One of Volume I, implementation of this direction was not consistent across all IMTs, some of which fell well short of what was demanded. A revised Joint SOP J2. November 2. 00. 9, has increased to 3. IMT. It also identifies four levels of IMT preparedness—from Preparedness Level A (the highest, with facilities tested on the day and a core IMT of eight in position from 1. IMT members being in position within 6. Preparedness Level D (facilities tested in the preceding week, basic staffing to be in position within 6. IMT of eight in position within 9. The default minimum preparedness level required for a location is set by reference to the fire danger index—the Grassland Fire Danger Index or the Forest Fire Danger Index, depending on the risk profile of the location in question—but a higher level of preparedness can be prescribed for any ICC on any particular day. The Commission supports this improved planning for IMT preparedness, although it notes that the CFA and DSE will need to monitor and audit compliance with the mandated preparedness levels. During the 2. 00. IMT preparedness levels stipulated in the revised SOP, and this should be rectified. The Commission is also concerned that the revised SOP does not require either that a full IMT be pre- emptively established on the most serious fire danger days or that level 3 IMTs be led by a level 3 Incident Controller. Even at the highest level of preparedness, the SOP requires only that there be a core IMT and a level 2 Incident Controller in position by 1. On days and in areas where the fire danger forecast is code red, a full IMT of 3. This would be suitable recognition of the potential consequences if fires occur on such days and of the probability that initial attack will fail. In its interim report the Commission recommended that further work be done to explore the options for re- examining the fire danger ratings and the severity scale. It is also unacceptable that fire agencies continue to prepare for days like 7 February without level 3 Incident Controllers placed in at least the highest risk locations. The events of 7 February (as discussed in Volume I) demonstrate the value of having experienced, qualified level 3 Incident Controllers in charge from the beginning of major fires. There are now about 1. Incident Controllers in Victoria, and this appears to be a sufficient number to allow level 3 Incident Controllers to be allocated to the locations considered at highest risk on a particular day. If this number is insufficient, the agencies must give priority to the training of more level 3 Incident Controllers. The agencies acknowledge the value of IMTs training together before an incident—in particular, joint IMTs that will have management of complex level 3 incidents. A number of expert witnesses also stressed the importance of training for emergencies; this is discussed in Chapter 1.
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